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workers from the new member states to the UK and Ireland. This paper analyzes the impact 
of this migration wave on the real wages in the source countries. I consider the case of 
Lithuania, which had the highest share of emigrants relative to its workforce among all ten 
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the emigration rate increases the real wage of men on average by 1%. Several robustness 
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The eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004 triggered a large ﬂow
of migrant workers from the new member states to the UK and Ireland. This
paper analyzes the impact of this migration wave on the real wages in the source
countries. I consider the case of Lithuania, which had the highest share of emigrants
relative to its workforce among all ten new member states. Using data from the
Lithuanian Household Budget Survey and the Irish Census, I ﬁnd that emigration
had a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on the wages of men who stayed in the country, but
no such eﬀect is visible for women. A percentage point increase in the emigration
rate increases the real wage of men on average by 1%. Several robustness checks
conﬁrm this result.
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11 Introduction
If a high number of workers emigrate from a country, this should lead to wage increases
for those workers who stay behind. When in 2004 eight countries from central and eastern
Europe joined the Europen Union, this triggered a wave of migration from East to West,
as workers were able to earn much higher wages in Ireland and the UK than in Poland,
Latvia or Lithuania. The question is, whether this emigration wave had an impact on
the wages of stayers. An answer to this question can be important for other countries
that might join the European Union in the future and whose workers face the same kind
of incentives to emigrate. Examples are countries in the Balkan region, such as Croatia,
Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, etc.
In this paper, I test empirically the hypothesis, whether emigration leads to an increase
in the wages of stayers, exploiting the eastern enlargement of the European Union in 2004
as a natural experiment. I choose Lithuania for my analysis, as this country lost a high
share of its workforce due to emigration after 2004. From 2004 to 2007 around 9% of
Lithuanian workers registered for a work permit in Ireland and the UK. To identify the
impact of emigration on the wages of stayers, I use variation in emigration rates and real
wages across gender, education, experience and over time, which follows Borjas (2003)
and Mishra (2007). The data come from the Lithuanian household budget survey, the
Irish census, as well as the data on UK and Irish work permits.
Using a reduced-form approach, I ﬁnd that an increase in emigration is associated with an
increase in real wages, but this only holds for certain groups of the workforce. While we
cannot see any statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect for the wages of women, I ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of emigration on the wages of men. When interaction terms are
included, it turns out that the eﬀect is higher for unmarried men than for married men.
For a percentage point increase in the emigration rate, the real wages of men increase on
average by around 1%. For unmarried men, this eﬀect is 1.5%, while for married men it
2is close to zero. The results are conﬁrmed by a number of robustness checks. I also adress
the question of causality. While I can show that reverse causality is unlikely, it can be the
case that the results are driven by a third factor that leads to spurious correlations. In
the absence of suitable instruments, an interaction of time and region dummies accounts
for this problem, as they absorb factors that can have an impact on wages over time, such
as FDI inﬂows, trade or EU strucutral funds. Given the fact that the inclusion of those
ﬁxed eﬀects does not change the statistical signiﬁcance and magnitude of the eﬀects, this
indicates a causal relationship.
This paper contributes to the scarce literature on the wage eﬀects of emigration. Mishra
(2007) analyzed in a careful empirical study the impact of emigration on wages in Mexico
over a time period of 30 years and found a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect. Batista (2007)
developed a dynamic macro model to analyze the contribution of capital ﬂows and emi-
gration to the convergence of Portuguese real wages to EU average after the country’s EU
accession. She only found a small contribution of emigration. Kaczmarczyk et al. (2009)
study the migration impact on Poland and Hazans & Philips (2009) analyze descriptively
the situation in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They ﬁnd a higher number in vacancies
after 2004, lower unemployment and a higher wage growth. These developments occurred
at the same time as migration, but the authors do not attempt to establish a causal re-
lationship.
My paper diﬀers from those papers as it exploits the EU enlargement a natural exper-
iment to show the short-run impact of emigration on the wages of stayers. From the
results we can see that this eﬀect can be sizeable in the short run.
The paper is outlined as follows: section 2 describes the historical context of this study
and explains its theoretical underpinnings. In section 3, I describe the identiﬁcation
strategy and the empirical framework. Section 4 presents the construction of the dataset.
Section 5 contains the results of the main estimation and robustness checks. Finally,
3section 6 concludes.
2 Historical Overview and Theoretical Considerations
2.1 Historical Overview
On May 1st 2004, the European Union was enlarged by ten new member states, of which
eight were former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This enlargement
posed considerable challenges to the old (EU-15) member countries. As the freedom of
movement for workers is one of the core principles of the European Union,1 workers from
the new member states would have been allowed to migrate freely and work in every
country of the European Union. Given the large wage diﬀerentials between the old and
new member states, some of the EU-15 countries feared negative consequences from the
immigration of cheap labor. Sinn (2004) calculated that around 5% of the population in
Central and Eastern Europe would migrate to the West after 2004. In countries with rigid
labor markets such as Germany and France, this would lead to decreasing wages of natives.
Moreover, as most Western European countries have generous welfare states, Sinn (2004)
expressed the fear of high ﬁscal burdens when migrants do not work but live on social
beneﬁts. As a consequence, the EU-15 countries agreed on transitional arrangements
before the EU enlargement, allowing countries to close their borders for workers from
the new member states until 2011.2 Only Ireland, the UK and Sweden opened their
labor markets immediately. While Sweden noticed a comparably small inﬂow from 2004
onwards3, Ireland and the UK became the major destinations for migrants from the
new member states. From 2004-2007, Ireland issued 391,618 work permits to nationals
from the accession countries from Central and Eastern Europe. The number of work
1 Art. 39 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community.
2 See Kahanec et al. (2009, p.4) for a description of the transitional arrangement.
3 Wadensjö (2007) reports around 19000 immigrants from the new EU member states to Sweden from
2004 to 2006.
4permits issued in the UK in the same time was 769,530.4 Some accession countries lost a
considerable share of their workforce due to migration. Figure 1 illustrates the number of
emigrants from 2004-2007 relative to the domestic workforce in 2003. Lithuania, Latvia
and Poland lost the highest share of their workers, whereas Hungary and the Czech
republic did not see big outﬂows of workers. The numbers reported in this ﬁgure reﬂect
an upper bound to migration. The actual losses to the workforce might be smaller, as
not all workers who received a work permit in Ireland and the UK, were actually part of
the workforce in the source countries. However, this ﬁgure shows that emigration led to
sizeable changes in labor supply in Central and Eastern Europe.
2.2 Theoretical Considerations
A standard textbook model of a labor market suggests that emigration is a negative
labor supply shock that leads to labor shortages, which result in upward pressure for
real wages. Considering one single labor market implicitly assumes homogeneity of the
workforce or, in other words, perfect substitutability of workers with diﬀerent skills. This
assumption is implausible, as a labor market is usually highly fragmented and the de-
gree of substitutability between diﬀerent groups of workers depends on the proximity of
skills. Workers with the same degree of education are closer substitutes than those with
a diﬀerent education. In a specialized economy, even within an education group, people
working in diﬀerent industries are not perfect substitutes. For example, a solicitor can-
not easily replace a physician and vice versa, even though both have a third-level degree.
If we take this heterogeneity of labor market participants and their various degrees of
substitutability into account, a theoretical model, such as the one proposed by Card &
Lemieux (2001), predicts that a group of workers that is aﬀected by an emigration shock
experiences a higher eﬀect on the wages of its own workers than any other group. As
4 Sources: CSO Ireland and UK Home Oﬃce.
5emigration did not occur equally to all skill groups, this variation can be exploited to
identify the eﬀect of emigration on real wages.
In their models, Card & Lemieux (2001) and Borjas (2003) assume that capital in this
economy is ﬁxed. If capital could fully adjust, migration would lead to capital outﬂows,
as a decrease in labor supply decreases the marginal product of capital. This was not
the case in Lithuania. Figure 6 shows that the capital stock in Lithuania was actually
growing from 2002 to 2006.5 In section 3.2, I will describe, how I account for those capital
ﬂows in the empirical model.
3 Empirical Framework
3.1 Identiﬁcation Strategy
To identify the impact of emigration on wages, I use variation in real wages and emigra-
tion rates across skill groups and over time. A skill group is deﬁned by gender, education
and work experience. This deﬁnition follows the works by Borjas (2003), Ottaviano &
Peri (2006, 2008) and Borjas et al. (2008). The conjecture behind this idea is that workers
belonging to the same skill group compete in the same labor market. Those skill groups
in the workforce which saw large outﬂows of workers should have, on average, higher
increases in real wages than those groups who did not experience high outﬂows. This
is a feasible identiﬁcation strategy in the case of Lithuania, as the data about educa-
tional attainment of emigrants is available from the Irish census. Their work experience
is not directly observable, but it can be calculated from the age and education of the
emigrants. The clustering of the workforce in education groups is based on the idea that
people within one education group are close substitutes in the labor market, whereas
5 I am aware of the possibility that capital could have increased even more in the absence of emigration.
However, I consider this eﬀect to be negligible.
6people from diﬀerent education groups are not. In other words, a bricklayer with lower
secondary education will hardly be able to replace an engineer with a third-level degree
and vice versa.
However, even within a particular education group, workers are not necessarily close sub-
stitutes if they diﬀer in work experience, as skill formation does not end with education.
Furthermore, workers acquire job-speciﬁc skills at their workplace, so that workers with
the same education and a similar work experience are close substitutes on the labor mar-
ket, whereas those with the same education but diﬀerent levels of work experience are
not. To account for those diﬀerent degrees of substitutability within workers of the same
education group, I cluster the workforce in three education and nine experience groups.
The education groups are lower secondary school and less, upper secondary school and
third-level degree. The experience groups are clusters of work experience intervals of ﬁve
years, i.e. 0-4 years, 5-9 years, 10-14 years and so on. As the choice of those 5-year
intervals is arbitrary, I will also use 2-year and 10-year clusters for robustness checks.
Section A.1 explains the clustering method in detail.
Additional sources of variation commonly used in the migration literature are geography
and occupations.6 In the case of emigration, information about the distribution of em-
igrants across industries and cities in the source country is not available, as emigrants
are usually not included in national surveys such as the census or the HBS. On the other
hand, the Irish census data does not state what Lithuanian region the immigrants came
from or what occupation they had prior to migration. There is information available in
the Irish census about their current occupation in Ireland, but this allows no conclusion
about their previous occupation in Lithuania. As Kahanec et al. (2009, p. 20) show, im-
migrants from the new EU member states after 2004 often took up jobs in the receiving
countries for which they were actually over-qualiﬁed.
6 See, for example Altonji & Card (1991) and Friedberg (2001)
73.2 Empirical Speciﬁcation
The basic empirical speciﬁcation essentially follows Friedberg (2001), who uses individual-
level data to investigate the impact of immigration in two-digit occupation categories on
real wages in Israel. Instead of occupations, I use worker skill groups as proposed by
Borjas (2003). As migration was triggered by a law change, I assume that it is exogenous
to changes in wages throughout the analysis.7
The basic empirical speciﬁcation used throughout the paper is
lnw
i
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0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ghjt denotes the log monthly real wage8 of individual i. mghjt is the emigration
rate of the skill group individual i belongs to. A skill group is composed of the follow-
ing characteristics: gender g (g=male, female), education h (h= lower secondary, upper
secondary, third-level) and experience group j (j= 0-4 years, 5-9 years,...,35-39 years,
40+ years). t is the relevant year of the cross-section (t=2002, 2003, 2005, 2006). The
emigration rate mghjt is a group variable that has the same value for all members of the
group in each year. Although all members of the group may not be aﬀected by emigra-
tion to the same extent, it is plausible that they are aﬀected in a similar way. Hence, I
expect the standard errors of the members of a particular group to be serially correlated.
This can lead to biased estimates, as reported standard errors can be much lower than
they in fact are.9 To overcome this bias, I cluster the standard errors on the level of
gender-education-experience-time cells.10 Throughout the whole analysis, I only consider
workers in the private sector. The argument for this is that the wage setting process in
the public sector can be inﬂuenced by factors that cannot be explained by competition,
7 I will discuss potential criticisms of this assumption in section 5.2.
8 Monthly wages are deﬂated by the Lithuanian HCPI. See table 1g) for the HCPI.
9 Angrist & Pischke (2009, ch.8) explain the bias resulting from clustered data and propose the
clustering of standard errors.
10 This makes an overall of 2  3  9  4 = 216 clusters
8such as political considerations or seniority pay plans, family size, etc.
The coeﬃcient of interest is , which measures the average percentage change in the real
wage of a gender-education-experience cell, if the emigration rate of workers in this cell
changes by one percentage point.
Xi
ghjt is a vector of individual control variables (gender, marital status, a dummy for
urban areas, number of children).
(regi  t) is an interaction term between a vector of year dummies (t) and a vector
of dummies for the county (regi) individual i lives in. The interaction accounts for un-
observable changes in economic conditions across regions over time that may have an
inﬂuence on real wages. Examples are the inﬂow of EU structural funds, interregional
migration, FDI inﬂows or a change in the magnitude and composition of trade ﬂows after
EU accession. The inclusion of this interaction helps to diminish the endogeneity and
omitted variable bias.
educh is a dummy for each education group h. It captures unobservable characteristics
that are common to the members of each education group and that do not change over
time. For example, workers with a third-level degree tend to work in white-collar occu-
pations, whereas workers with a lower secondary education rather have blue-collar jobs.
The choice of those jobs inﬂuences their earnings, but we cannot observe the individual’s
occupation from the Lithuanian data. A similar selection pattern might occur among
workers with diﬀerent levels of work experience. Within an occupation, older workers
might have diﬀerent tasks than younger workers. This diﬀerence can aﬀect their wages.
These time-invariant unobservable characteristics of diﬀerent experience groups are cap-
tured by the experience group dummies expj.
All regressions are weighted with sampling weights given in the HBS. A sampling weight
is deﬁned as the inverse of the probability that an observation is included in the sample.
The use of those weights becomes necessary, as some groups are over- and underrepre-
9sented in the sample compared to the population. This sampling design of the survey
would lead to biased estimates. The weighting of all regressions with those sampling
weights eliminates this bias.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The core dataset used in this study is the annual Lithuanian Household Budget Survey,
which includes the characteristics and wages of stayers in Lithuania. The characteristics
of emigrants are taken from the Irish census data of the years 2002 and 2006. Finally, the
numbers of emigrants are extracted from the Irish “Personal and Public Service Numbers”
(PPS) and the “National Insurance Numbers” (NINo) from the United Kingdom. Those
data sources result in a pooled cross-sectional dataset covering the two years before EU
accession 2002, 2003, and the two years afterwards, 2005 and 2006. I deliberately omitted
the year 2004 from my analysis, as it is unclear, how many people actually emigrated in
2004. The registration numbers in the UK and Ireland in 2004 may reﬂect the fact that
workers had been living and working illegally in those countries before 2004, but only
applied for a work permit when Lithuania joined the EU.
The variables of interest throughout the whole study are real wages and emigration rates.
The real wages can be taken from the Lithuanian HBS. The emigration rates per skill
group are not directly observable and have to be calculated using information from dif-
ferent data sources. I take the skill distribution of Lithuanian emigrants from the Irish
census data. As there is no microdata about Lithuanian emigrants to the UK available
to me, I assume that the skill distribution of migrants to the UK is the same as the skill
distribution of migrants to Ireland. As the total inﬂows of Lithuanian workers, measured
from the numbers of work permits diﬀer between Ireland and the UK, I assume that the
ﬂows to the UK per skill group are directly proportional to the ﬂows to Ireland. The
number of work permits in the UK relative to the number of work permits in Ireland in
10a given year describes this proportion. To obtain the emigration rates, the number of
emigrants in a skill group is divided by the number of people in the Lithuanian workforce,
who belong to the same skill group. In section A.2, I describe the calculation of emigra-
tion rates and discuss the necessary assumptions in detail. I also explain the cleaning of
the data in section A.3.
The following sections give a description about the data sources used in this study.
Lithuanian Household Budget Survey
The Lithuanian Household Budget Survey (HBS) is an annually conducted survey of
7000-8000 households. It includes individual characteristics of household members as
well as the income and expenditure of the household. The HBS is representative at the
individual level.
To match the Lithuanian data with the Irish census data, I restrict the sample to all
employees aged 18-64. The variables taken into consideration are income from employ-
ment of the household head and her personal characteristics, such as gender, marital
status, the number of children, etc. Self-employed workers are dropped from the sample,
as their income is decomposed in the HBS into several income categories which are not
easily traceable for most observations. The data on income is self-reported and could as
such be subject to misreporting. This does not seem to be the case for the Lithuanian
HBS. Table 1j) compares the average self-reported income for men and women from the
HBS with the average income reported by the Lithuanian statistical oﬃce, and we can
conclude that misreporting should not be an issue.
Table 1a) summarizes the properties of the HBS. Table 1c) indicates that the income
from employment for all groups has increased on average between 2002 and 2006.
11Irish Census
The Irish census was carried out in the years 2002 and 2006 and covers all people that
were present in the Republic of Ireland in the census night. The Central Statistics Oﬃce
(CSO) of Ireland provided a tabulation of all Lithuanians in the census of 2002 and 2006,
their educational attainment, gender and age. The Irish census data makes it possible
to calculate the gender-education-experience distribution of Lithuanian migrants, which
will be used to calculate the emigration rates from Lithuania for diﬀerent education and
experience groups.11 Table 1b) illustrates the magnitude of the emigration wave from
Lithuania after EU accession.
The diﬀerence in the magnitude of Lithuanian migrant numbers between 2002 and 2006
is noteworthy. Despite the fact that I do not have precise information about the year,
in which the immigrants arrived, this diﬀerence conﬁrms that most of the Lithuanians in
the Irish census came to Ireland around or after the country’s EU accession.
Tables 1d) and 1e) show the distribution of education groups in the Irish census and in
the Lithuanian HBS. The share of workers with a third-level and those with upper sec-
ondary education is lower among Lithuanian immigrants in Ireland than among stayers.
At the same time, the share of workers with lower secondary education is higher in among
immigrants in Ireland. This diﬀerence in the educational distribution indicates a pattern
of negative selection of migrants.
PPS and NINo numbers
As described above, the Irish census data can be used to determine the characteristics
of Lithuanian emigrants. However, the ﬁgures of the census are only a lower bound
to emigration numbers, as they are considerably lower than the ﬁgures reported by the
11 See section A.2
12worker registration schemes in the UK and Ireland. In the time from 2002 to 2007, 63,412
Lithuanians applied for a PPS number in Ireland and 90820 for a NINo number in the
UK. Figure 2 shows the migration pattern over time. Obviously, the large emigration
wave set in when Lithuania joined the EU in 2004.
All immigrants who wish to come to Ireland and take up legal employment are required
to apply for a PPS number. Hence, the PPS numbers capture the amount of all labor mi-
grants coming to Ireland, no matter how long they actually stay in the country and what
type of job they are employed in. There is no obligation to de-register once a migrant
leaves Ireland. Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the PPS numbers how long immi-
grants actually stay in Ireland and how many return to Lithuania. The NINo numbers in
the UK are equivalent to the PPS numbers in Ireland.12 The UK government introduced
an additional registration scheme for arriving workers from the new EU member states
(WRS). The data on migration ﬂows from Lithuania to the UK are similar to those from
the NINo numbers, but they only cover the period from 2004 onwards. Hence, NINo
numbers are more suitable for my analysis, as they cover the whole time span from 2002.
The number of immigrants can generally be overstated in the PPS and NINo numbers,
as some Lithuanians might be registered in both countries. I will use the PPS and NINo
numbers as weights in the calculation of emigration rates in section A.2, taking into con-
sideration that they are an upper bound to migrant numbers and may contain double
counts as well as workers who stayed abroad for a very short period in time, e.g. for a
summer job.




I estimate the ﬁxed-eﬀect model in equation (1) with OLS, for which Table 3 (panel A)
shows the regression results. The basic results, including all private sector workers are
displayed in column (1). Controlling for observable and unobservable worker character-
istics, I ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of emigration on real wages.
In economic terms, the coeﬃcient of the emigration rate means that an increase in the
emigration rate of a certain gender-education-experience group by one percentage point,
increases the wages of this group on average by 0.66%. As we can see, men have on aver-
age higher earnings than women, the same holds for people living in an agglomeration13
and people who are married. The variable Children denotes the number of children under
16 living with the individual. The coeﬃcient is negative and statistically signiﬁcant, but
economically negligible, as every child decreases income from employment on average by
0.036%.
Within the population, diﬀerent groups of the labor force may be aﬀected diﬀerently by
emigration, for example men more than women, married people more than unmarried.
To account for diﬀerent wage eﬀects for men and women, I include interaction terms of
the emigration rate with the dummy for male (see table 3, column (2)). Furthermore, as
unmarried people tend to be more mobile than married people and might diﬀer in unob-
servable characteristics, the wage eﬀect might diﬀer for married and unmarried people.
I account for this diﬀerence in table (3) column (3) with an additional interaction of the
emigration rate with the dummy for married. This allows me to analyze the wage eﬀects
for four diﬀerent groups: married women, unmarried women, married men, unmarried
men.
13 The agglomeration dummy equals 1 if the person lives in one of the ﬁve largest cities of Lithuania
(Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipeda, Siauliai, Panevezys) and zero otherwise.
14Table 4 (panel A) reports the marginal eﬀects of a 1-percentage-point increase in the
emigration rate on the real wages of diﬀerent groups. As we can see, there is a statis-
tically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect for men. For every percentage point increase in their
emigration rate, their real wage increases by around 1.2%. For women, we cannot see a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. A reason for the diﬀerent eﬀect between men and women
might be the fact that emigrant women might actually not be part of the Lithuanian
labor force. In case they did not emigrate out of the workforce, it is not surprising that
we cannot ﬁnd evidence for wage increases, as their outﬂow is not a negative labor supply
shock. Another explanation can be that women work in industries that are not aﬀected
by emigration, so that no wage eﬀect is visible.14 The obvious gender pay gap15 indicates
such a self-selection behavior.
Considering the diﬀerent eﬀects for married and unmarried people, we can see that there
is no visible eﬀect for women. For men, we can see a sizeable diﬀerence in the eﬀects of
emigration on their real wages between unmarried and married men. At the same time,
unmarried men saw their real wages increase on average by 1.4% for every percentage
point increase in the emigration rate, while for married men, this eﬀect is close to zero.
Despite the fact that the eﬀect for married men is statistically highly signiﬁcant, the size
of the eﬀect is economically negligible.
The diﬀerence in the wage eﬀect for married and unmarried men can have a number of
reasons. Of course, there are no distinct labor markets for both groups. The higher wage
eﬀect for unmarried men might be driven by observable and unobservable characteristics.
Unmarried men are more ﬂexible and have lower moving costs, which gives them a higher
bargaining power towards their employers. They can use the possibility of emigration as
a credible threat. Moreover, unmarried men are on average younger than married men. If
14 Around 40% of all female workers are employed in the public sector, while the share of male workers
is only 20%. Source: Statistics Lithuania
15 See the coeﬃcients for the male dummy in table 3, column (3). Even in the absence of migration,
men earn on average more than women.
15younger workers have higher wage increases than older workers, this translates into higher
wage increases for unmarried men.16 Another unobservable characteristic could be the
type of profession married and unmarried people choose. Married people might be more
conservative and choose jobs that give them security but are not subject to high wage
increases, whereas unmarried men might rather pick jobs that are riskier but experience
higher wage increases.
5.2 Robustness Checks
5.2.1 Do the Results Suﬀer from Reverse Causality?
As the results in section 5.1 are derived using OLS, they measure a correlation between
emigration and wages. However, a causal interpretation of emigration on wages is only
possible, if we can exclude reverse causality. In our case, reverse causality would mean
that wages drive emigration. This is certainly possible and would lead to biased estimates.
As I cannot entirely exclude reverse causality, it is important to understand the direction
of the bias. As it turns out, reverse causality leads to a downward bias in the estimates
of the parameter  in equation (1). As a consequence, the coeﬃcients obtained in the
regressions in section 5.1 reﬂect a lower bound to the actual eﬀects, so that the eﬀect is
at least as great as . This can be shown as follows:
Take a simpliﬁed version of the model in equation (1),
lnw = m + u; (2)
where u is an error term. In case emigration drives wages, the coeﬃcient  should be
positive, as stayers become a more scarce resource because of higher emigration, which
16 As the variation of emigration rates and wage changes across experience groups is central to the
identiﬁcation strategy, I do not test for a diﬀerence in wage increases for workers of diﬀerent age.
16leads to an increase in their wages. On the other hand, if we regress emigration rates on
wages, the regression becomes
m =  lnw + v; (3)
with v being the error term. The direction of the bias then depends on the sign of the
coeﬃcient . If wages were driving emigration, I would expect a negative relationship
between wages and emigration, so that  < 0: the lower the wages are, the higher the
number of emigrants. If those two eﬀects work at the same time, we can add equations








As we can see from this equation,  >  1
1 , which is valid as  < 0, so that the
estimate of the coeﬃcient  in equation (1) is a lower bound to the eﬀect of emigration
on wages.
5.2.2 Are the Results Driven by a Third Factor?
Even if reverse causality is not an issue, the correlations found in table 3 may not lead
to a causal interpretation, if there is a third factor that drives migration and wages at
the same time. In case of the EU eastern enlargement, this situation is likely. The ac-
cession of Lithuania did not only trigger a wave of emigration, the country could also
beneﬁt from a deeper trade integration, increased FDI inﬂows, domestic investment and
the inﬂows of EU structural funds. Economic theory implies that those factors, trade
and capital inﬂows, increase labor demand, which translates into higher wages. Hence,
the correlation obtained from the OLS estimates might be spurious and does not lead
to any conclusion about causality. One way to overcome this problem would be the use
17of instrumental variables. However, in the context of the European enlargement it is
diﬃcult to ﬁnd suitable instruments, which are correlated with the emigration rate and
not correlated with wages, as the EU accession changed the economic conditions from
one day to another, so that most variables will be correlated with wage changes.
Another problem that arises in OLS regressions when we do not control for additional
variables that drive wages, is omitted variable bias. Without the use of instrumental
variables, this bias cannot be entirely eliminated, but it can be reduced, either by the
inclusion of appropriate ﬁxed eﬀects or by the inclusion of observable control variables,
which have an eﬀect on wages, such as FDI or trade. In equation (1) and in all subsequent
robustness checks, I include an interaction between a set of region dummies and a set of
time dummies. These interactions absorb changes in wages across regions over time and
as such, they absorb the variation that is caused by changes in labor demand over time.
The rationale behind this is that demand factors like inﬂows of FDI and EU structural
funds, as well as trade ﬂows, have a diﬀerent eﬀect on every region and on the wage level
in this region.
As a robustness check, I omit the interaction region*year from equation (1) and include
log(FDI stocks), log(Exports) and log(GDP per capita) in the regression.17 Those three
variables are measured at the county level and denominated in 2005 Litas. Panel B of
table 3 reports the results for these regressions. None of the included variables (FDI,
exports and GDP) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In panel B of table 4 we
can see the marginal eﬀects of emigration on wages. Compared to the results in panel A,
the results in panel B have the same statistical signiﬁcance and magnitude. The question
arises, which method is more helpful in reducing the omitted variable bias. As the in-
teraction terms region*year absorb all the developments that aﬀect the wages diﬀerently
across regions over time, this method reduces the bias more than the inclusion of the
three observable variables. Because the data on some variables, such as the inﬂow of
17 Source: Lithuanian statistical oﬃce.
18EU strucural funds at a regional level, is not readily available, the omitted variable bias
should be greater in the latter case.
5.2.3 Did the Migrants Emigrate out of Unemployment?
The increased mobility for Lithuanian workers after EU accession made it also possible
for unemployed people to emigrate and look for work in Ireland and the UK. From the
Irish census, I do not have any information about the previous employment status of the
migrant workers. As we can see in table 1i), unemployment fell from 13.8% in 2002 to
5.6% in 2006. This decline can be due to a favourable economic climate,18 as well as due
to emigration. Emigration can aﬀect unemployment mainly through two channels: 1)
unemployed people emigrate, 2) unemployed people take up jobs of people who emigrate.
I consider the ﬁrst channel as unrealistic, as the skill requirements in Ireland and the
UK are on average higher than in Lithuania, so that it is less likely for someone who
is unemployed in Lithuania to ﬁnd a job abroad. Moreover, immigrant workers from
other EU member states only become eligible for social beneﬁts in the UK and Ireland
after working there for one year.19 Thus, Lithuanian workers did not have an incentive
to emigrate into unemployment and live on social beneﬁts. The second channel could
play a more important role than the ﬁrst one and can as such be part of the story, why
wages increase when workers emigrate. However, if unemployed workers replace workers
who emigrated and receive the same wage, this would at maximum downward-bias the
estimates obtained in section 5.1, so that the eﬀect of emigration would be higher in
absence of this job replacement mechanism.
18 GDP growth from 2002-2006 was between 7 and 10%, see table 1k).
19 Source: Irish Welfare Oﬃce, UK Department of Work and Pensions.
195.2.4 Are the Results Inﬂuenced by Immigration from Other Countries?
Wages are just one possible channel, through which the labor market can adjust to an
emigration shock. Another adjustment channel is immigration from other countries. If
domestic workers who emigrant are replaced by immigrant workers with the same skills,
this should leave wages unchanged. As we can see in table 1h), Lithuania saw in fact
an increase in migration from 2002 to 2006. However, if we break the immigration down
by country, we can see that the number of immigrants from the former Soviet Union
and other countries remains the same, whereas the number of Lithuanian immigrants
increases. This reﬂects the fact that many Lithuanians emigrated for a short period in
time and ﬁnally returned to their home country. Even though I cannot directly control
for return migration,20 I accounted for this fact in the calculation of emigration rates in
section A.2, so that immigration from other countries and return migration should not
bias the estimates.
5.2.5 Do the Emigration Rates of other Skill Groups Have an Eﬀect?
The wages of a certain skill group do not only depend on the labor supply of this particular
skill group, but also on the labor supply of other skill groups. If diﬀerent skill groups
enter the aggregate production function of an economy as separate labor inputs, a negative
labor supply shock to one cell leads to a decreasing marginal product of all the other cells
and therefore lowers wages. To account for this interdependence between diﬀerent skill
groups, I augment the speciﬁcation in equation (1) as follows:
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20 The HBS does not contain information about the number of return migrants by skill group.
20where mghkt are the emigration rates of all other experience groups within education
group j. mghkt are the emigration rates of the same experience group j but a diﬀerent
education group h.21 Table 5a) reports the results for the regressions of equation (5).
The sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients for the diﬀerent groups are the same as in the
basic model. The eﬀect of emigration on the real wages of men comes out slightly smaller
than in section 5.1, but the robustness check generally conﬁrms the previous results.
5.2.6 Do the results depend on the calculation of skill groups?
So far, I have controlled for a worker’s experience by including dummies for experience
groups. In the literature, work experience often enters the econometric model as a con-
tinous variable.22 This makes it possible to account for diminishing marginal returns to
work experience by including a squared term. The empirical speciﬁcation for this is
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where expi is the work experience of individual i. The results are displayed in table 5b)
and do not diﬀer a lot from the ones in section 5.1.
In section 5.1, the workforce was clustered in 5-year work experience groups under the
assumption that within an experience group, workers are perfect substitutes. The choice
of those intervals, though widely used in the literature, is purely arbitrary. To check,
whether the results are driven by the way the skill groups are clustered, I re-run spec-
iﬁcation (1), using 2-year and 10-year experience groups. The results can be seen in
tables 5d) and 5e). In terms of sign and signiﬁcance, the coeﬃcients are equivalent to the
ones obtained in section 5.1. The marginal eﬀects of the 2-year cells are smaller than for
21 Due to multicollinearity issues, it is not possible to include the emigration rates from all other
gender-education-experience groups.
22 See, for example, Chiswick (1978).
21the 10-year cells. This diﬀerence can be due to the fact that 2-year cells allow for more
variation in real wages and emigration rates across skill groups.
5.2.7 Interaction year*education
When Lithuania joined the EU in 2004, this accession did not only trigger an emigra-
tion wave, but the country also got access to EU structural funds and received higher
FDI inﬂows. These factors can increase labor demand and as such have an impact on
wages. In the basic speciﬁcation of equation (1), I attempted to capture those factors
by including time ﬁxed eﬀects and an interaction of region and time dummies. The time
dummies capture unobservable eﬀects on the average wages of all workers in a given
year. The interaction region*year captures unobservable heterogeneous drivers of wage
changes across regions over time. However, neither the time dummies nor the interaction
accounts for heterogeneous changes in wages across education groups over time. The EU
structural funds beneﬁted particularly sectors that employ low-skilled workers, such as
the construction sector. In this case, the inﬂow of structural funds would have a greater
impact on the wages of low-skilled workers than on the ones of high-skilled workers. These
unobservable heterogeneous wage changes for diﬀerent education groups over time can be
captured by an interaction of the time dummies with the dummies for education groups.
As we can see in table 5c), the eﬀect of emigration on the real wages is slightly smaller,
but in terms of sign and signiﬁcance, this robustness check conﬁrms the ﬁndings from
section 5.1.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I exploit a natural experiment to estimate the impact of emigration on
stayers. I choose Lithuania for my case study, which lost a high share of its workforce
due to emigration after the country’s EU accession. The main result in this paper is that
22there is a positive eﬀect of emigration on the wages of stayers. However, this eﬀect is not
signiﬁcant for all groups of the workforce. While the wages of men increased signiﬁcantly
due to emigration, I cannot ﬁnd such an eﬀect for women. The use of interaction terms
revealed that the increase in wages was higher for unmarried men than for married men.
These results are plausible, as unmarried men are more ﬂexible than married men, which
gives them a higher likelihood to emigrate. If this translates into a higher bargaining
power, their wages will increase more than the wages of other groups.
The results turn out to be robust subject to a number of robustness checks. In the absence
of appropriate instruments, the question of a causal relationship between emigration and
wages can only be answered indicatively. Given that the EU accession was an exogenous
event and given that we control appropriately for other factors that might inﬂuence
migration and wages, the causality of emigration increasing wages seems likely.
While in this study I was only able to account for capital ﬂows using ﬁxed eﬀects, it would
be interesting to investigate the contribution of capital ﬂows to the changes in wages after
2004. For such a study, a structural model such as in Ottaviano & Peri (2006, 2008) is
needed. This could be the subject of future research.
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27A Data
A.1 Clustering: Education-Experience Groups
A.1.1 Education Groups
The Lithuanian education system oﬀers a variety of educational tracks and degrees.23 I
aggregate the diﬀerent education levels into three broad education groups for two reasons:
Firstly, the Irish census only includes ﬁve diﬀerent education groups (primary and lower,
lower secondary school, upper secondary school, third-level - no degree and third-level
degree), so that a matching of the educational attainment of emigrants and stayers is
only possible if broader education groups are considered. Secondly, in some cases diﬀerent
educational tracks in Lithuania lead to comparable degrees. For example, the basic school,
which students ﬁnish at the age of 16, and the stage I of vocational training. Both of
those tracks lead to a basic school leaving certiﬁcate. Thus, students holding either of
those comparable degrees can be seen as close substitutes on the labor market and should
be equally aﬀected by the emigration of workers with comparable characteristics. Tables
1d) and 1e) show the distribution of the education levels in the Lithuanian HBS as well
as in the Irish census.
I deﬁne the education groups as follows: Lower secondary school and less, upper secondary
school and third-level degree.
Lower Secondary School and Less People with 10 years of schooling or less. As
the Lithuanian HBS contains very few observations with primary school education or
less, I merge these with the category lower secondary school. Therefore, in terms of the
Lithuanian classiﬁcation, this category includes highschool dropouts, workers who only
ﬁnished primary school, those with a basic school leaving certiﬁcate (usually obtained at
23 http://www.euroguidance.lt provides an overview of the Lithuanian education system.
28the age of 16) and those who pursued stage I of vocational training, which also leads to a
basic school leaving certiﬁcate. In the Irish census, this group consists of primary school
and less and lower secondary school.
Upper secondary school This category includes all workers having a degree higher
than a basic school leaving certiﬁcate (i.e. at least 11 years of schooling), but do not
hold a degree that would allow them to enter a masters’ programme at a university in
Lithuania or abroad. The dominant degree in this category is the Lithuanian A-level,
usually obtained at the age of 18. The other degrees of this category are stages II, III
and IV of vocational training and certiﬁcates from non-university third-level institutions.
In the Irish census, this category contains all workers with an upper secondary school
degree or a third-level education that does not lead to a university degree.
Third-level degree All workers with at least 15 years of schooling and a degree that
enables them to apply for a university masters’ degree in Lithuania or abroad. Workers
with a masters’ or a PhD degree are also included here.
A.1.2 Experience Groups
Within each education group, I cluster the workforce by groups of work experience.
Following Borjas (2003), workers of ﬁve consecutive years of work experience form one
experience group: workers with 0-4 years of experience, 5-9 years, 10-14 years, etc. up to
the group 40+ years. The work experience is not directly observable from the Irish cen-
sus data, but can be calculated. Assuming that people enter the labor market right after
completion of their education, the work experience is calculated according to the formula
experi = agei   educi   6, where agei is the age of individual i, educi is the duration of
her highest education individual i has ﬁnished and children usually enter school at the
age of 6. educi equals 10 years for workers with lower secondary school, 12 years with
29upper secondary school and 15 years with a third-level degree.
A.2 Calculation of Emigration Rates
Although the number of emigrants in each education-experience cell is not directly observ-
able, the available data allows me to construct sensible measures of emigration numbers
for diﬀerent skill groups. The idea behind the calculation is the following: take the
gender-education-experience distribution from the Irish census and weight it with the
corresponding numbers of workers who applied for PPS and NINo numbers in Ireland
and the UK. By dividing the calculated emigrant number of a certain gender-education-
experience cell by the number of people in Lithuania with the same characteristics, we
obtain the emigration rates.
The calculation of emigration rates requires three assumptions about the emigrants’
gender-skill distribution: 1) the distribution is the same in the UK and in Ireland. 2)
The distribution in 2002 is the same as in 2003, and 3) the distribution in 2005 is the
same as in 2006.
The ﬁrst assumption implicitly claims that no sorting behavior among migrants between
the two destinations Ireland and the UK could be noticed. This assumption is backed
by the recent literature on immigration to Ireland and the UK. When we compare the
descriptive statistics of the studies by Barrett & Duﬀy (2008, p.605) for Ireland and Dust-
mann et al. (2009, p.23) for the UK, the educational distribution of immigrants from the
A8 countries24 who came after 2004, looks fairly similar (see table 2). Hazans & Philips
(2009) analyze the occupational distribution of Lithuanians in Ireland and the UK. On
the one hand, there is a diﬀerence in the sectors that employ Lithuanian immigrants in
both countries. In the UK, around 30% of Lithuanian immigrants work in agriculture,
24 A8 countries are: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slove-
nia.
30whereas in Ireland this share is only 5%. This result could lead to the conclusion that
migrants in the UK diﬀered in their skills from those in Ireland. On the other hand,
the same study shows that in both countries around 80% of Lithuanian migrants work
in sectors that typically employ less-skilled workers, such as construction, health, trade,
manufacturing, hotels and restaurants and agriculture. This indicates the absence of sort-
ing behavior, so that it is reasonable to assume that the skill distribution of Lithuanian
immigrants is the same in Ireland and the UK.
Assumptions 2) and 3) are reasonable as the education distribution among Lithuanian
emigrants in Ireland did not change signiﬁcantly from 2002 to 2006, even though the
number of migrants is nine times higher in 2006. As we can see in table 1e), the share
of immigrants with a third-level degree is slightly lower in 2006. At the same time, the
share of those with lower secondary education is higher, but both distributions - 2002
and 2006 - do not diﬀer a lot. Taken together, these three assumptions make it possible
to extrapolate the skill distribution given in the Irish census to the UK and to the years
that are not covered in the Irish census, 2003 and 2005. This allows me to present a
more realistic picture of the size and impact of migration ﬂows than we would get by
only using the Irish data for 2002 and 2006 without extrapolating. In the robustness
checks in section 5.2, I drop those assumptions. We will see that this has an impact on
the magnitude, but not on the sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the wage eﬀects.
For the calculation of the number of emigrants for each gender-education-experience cell
in the years 2002 and 2006, I use the number of Lithuanians in the Irish census of the
same year and multiply it with a weighting factor, which accounts for the migration ﬂows
to the UK. For the years 2003 and 2005, I additionally weight the calculated number with
the PPS and NINo numbers of those years.
Let xt
ghj denote the number of people in the Irish census of gender(g)-education(h)-














ghj is the calculated number of emigrants in cell ghj in year t. NINOt and
PPSt are the NINo and PPS numbers issued to Lithuanians in year t. The ﬁrst term in
parentheses (1 in this case), accounts for the fact that I consider the raw migrant numbers
in the census 2002 and 2006 for Ireland. The second term in parantheses, NINOt
PPSt , is a
weighting factor for the extrapolation of the migrant skill distribution of the Irish census
to the UK. If, for example, in 2006 the number NINo applications is twice the number
of PPS applications, this factor is 2. Table 1e) displays the ﬁgures of PPS and NINo
numbers issued between 2002 and 2006.
For the year 2003, I take the number of Lithuanian migrants in cell ghj of the year 2002















PPS2002 weights the number of migrants in the Irish census in 2002 with the change in PPS
numbers from 2002 to 2003. Suppose the number of Lithuanian immigrants in Ireland




PPS2002 accounts for the
change in PPS numbers, as well as for the diﬀerence in migration ﬂows to the UK and
Ireland in 2003.25















PPS2002 actually consists of two factors: NINO2003
PPS2003 , which accounts for the size of migrant ﬂows
to the UK relative to Ireland and PPS2003
PPS2002, accounting for the change in migration ﬂows to Ireland
from 2002 to 2003. By multiplication of those two terms, PPS2003 cancels out.
32For my econometric analysis, emigration rates are more relevant than absolute emigrant
numbers, as the coeﬃcient  in equation (1) can then be interpreted as a quasi-elasticity.
An increase in the emigration rate of one percentage point would then increase the real
wage by  percent.








ghj denotes the number of emigrants calculated in equations (7) to (9). The
denominator of equation 10 is the number of people in year t living in Lithuania and be-
longing to cell ghj. Due to the fact that I do not have data covering the entire Lithuanian
population, I have to calculate the number from the HBS. The HBS is representative at
the household level, so that I can calculate the total number of Lithuanians in cell ghj
by summing up the sampling weights pghijt
26 over all observations i that are in cell ghj
in year t.
A.3 Data Cleaning
Additional to the data cleaning mentioned in section 4, I made the following changes in
the respective datasets:
Irish census
 Dropped observations if age is less than 18 years
 Calculated emigration numbers are rounded to full digits
26 The sampling weight pghijt is the inverse probability that observation i is included in the sample.
33Lithuanian HBS The following observations were dropped:
 Disposable income less than 0
 Socioeconomic status "pensioner" or not reported
 Less than 18 and more than 64 years old
 Workers, whose income is neither from employment nor self-employment
 Workers who own a farm or are self-employed
34B Tables
35Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Year 2002 2003 2005 2006
a) Number of observations in the Lithuanian HBS, employees aged 18-64
All workers 3950 4136 4042 3874
Men 2322 2411 2426 2314
Women 1628 1725 1616 1560
b) Number of observations in the Irish census, employees aged 18-64
All workers 1904 - - 21779
Men 987 - - 12300
Women 917 - - 9479
c) Mean private sector income from employment in Litas, deﬂated
by the HCPI. Source: own calculations from the Lithuanian HBS
All workers 1084 1142 1339 1533
Men 1139 1216 1405 1628
Women 906 905 1107 1249
d) Distribution of education in the Lithuanian HBS
lower secondary 9% 10.6% 10.9% 9.9%
upper secondary 68.8% 69.0% 67.5% 67.5%
third-level 22.2% 20.4% 21.6% 22.6%
e) Distribution of education of Lithuanians in the Irish census
lower secondary 16.7% - - 20.4%
upper secondary 63.4% - - 62.2%
third-level 19.9% - - 17.4%
f) Numbers of work permits (PPS and NINo).
Sources: Irish Department of Social and Family Aﬀairs
UK Department for Work and Pensions.
PPS 2709 2394 18680 16017
NINo 1430 3140 10710 24200
g) Lithuanian HCPI, 2005=100, source: Eurostat
97.334 96.291 100 103.788
h) Immigrants to Lithuania (by nationality), source: Statistics Lithuania
Lithuanian 809 1313 4705 5508
Belarussian, Russian, Ukrainian 2478 1915 874 1337
Other 1823 1500 1210 900
Total 5110 4728 6789 7745
i) Unemployment rate in Lithuania, source: Statistics Lithuania
13.8% 12.4% 8.3% 5.6%
j) Average monthly gross wage, private sector workers, in LTL
Statistics Lithuania Men 1173 1227 1420 1676
Women 998 1029 1167 1356
Lithuanian HBS (calculated average) Men 1185 1252 1440 1688
Women 940 988 1189 1303
k) real GDP growth, year-on-year, source: Statistics Lithuania
6.8% 10.2% 7.8% 7.8%
36Table 2: Distribution of education among A8 immigrants after 2004 in Ireland and the
UK
authors Barrett & Duﬀy (2008) Dustmann et al. (2009)
country Ireland UK
lower secondary 11.1% 11.9%
upper secondary 61% 56.1%
third-level 28.2% 32%
37Table 3: OLS, weighted with sampling weights. Men and women - private sector. De-
pendent variable: log(real wage)
A: interaction region*year B: Controls FDI, Trade, GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES all interaction interaction all interaction interaction
male male*married male male*married
Emigration rate 0.657** 0.390 0.389 0.673** 0.406 0.411
[0.2786] [0.3549] [0.3377] [0.2752] [0.3147] [0.3360]
Emigration * Male 0.774** 1.115** 0.776*** 1.118***
[0.3222] [0.3897] [0.3191] [0.3853]
Emigration * married -0.336 -0.3821
[0.4498] [0.4443]
Emigration * married * male -1.057* -1.043*
[0.5700] [0.5698]
Male 0.168*** 0.147*** 0.144*** 0.166*** 0.146*** 0.143***
[0.0184] [0.0197] [0.0203] [0.0184] [0.0197] [0.0206]
Married 0.522*** 0.524*** 0.549*** 0.524*** 0.527*** 0.552***
[0.0252] [0.0251] [0.0293] [0.0249] [0.0248] [0.0290]
Children -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.032***
[0.0110] [0.0110] [0.0110] [0.0109] [0.0109] [0.0110]
Agglomeration 0.381*** 0.380*** 0.381*** 0.379*** 0.378*** 0.380***
[0.0232] [0.0232] [0.0231] [0.0228] [0.0228] [0.0227]
log(exports) 0.009 0.007 0.012
[0.0821] [0.0821] [0.0824]
log(gdp per cap.) 0.610* 0.614* 0.622*
[0.3160] [0.3159] [0.3165]
log(fdi stocks) 0.024 0.024 0.025
[0.0164] [0.0165] [0.0165]
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Education Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Experience Group FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Region Dummies no no no yes yes yes
Interaction yes yes yes no no no
Region*Year
Observations 9970 9970 9970 9970 9970 9970
Adjusted R2 0.3669 0.3674 0.3681 0.3663 0.3667 0.3675
Robust standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
38Table 4: Marginal eﬀects of emigration on wages for diﬀerent groups, results from table
3. P-values in brackets.







Women, unmarried 0.3895 0.4109
(0.2500) (0.2227)
Women, married -0.0532 0.0288
(0.4934) (0.4411)
Men, unmarried 1.5047*** 1.5293***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Men, married 0.1109*** 0.0002***
(0.0006) (0.0003)
39Table 5: Robustness checks. Marginal eﬀects of emigration on wages for diﬀerent groups.
P-values in brackets.
a) b) c) d) e)
All 0.3396 0.4929* 0.6032** 0.4517*** 0.8471**
(0.3415) (0.0827) (0.0342) (0.0035) (0.0288)
Women 0.6835 0.2352 0.3572 0.2640 0.6301*
(0.8322) (0.4968) (0.2630) (0.2443) (0.0832)
Men 0.9910*** 0.9420*** 1.108*** 0.9051*** 1.6341***
(0.0006) (0.0047) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Women, unmarried 0.1042 0.2030 0.3509 0.2970 0.5537*
(0.7587) (0.5931) (0.3071) (0.2095) (0.1355)
Women, married -0.2357 0.0616 0.0297 -0.0934 0.7490
(0.7410) (0.8657) (0.5674) (0.4171) (0.2232)
Men, unmarried 1.3518*** 1.2050*** 1.4452*** 1.0361*** 2.1384***
(0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Men, married -0.0407*** 0.0862*** -0.0471*** 0.0524*** 0.9438***
(0.0013) (0.0064) (0.0006) (0.0019) (0.0005)
a) Emigration rates of other cells included (section 5.2.5)
b) experience included as a continuous variable (section 5.2.6)
c) interaction education group * year (section 5.2.7)
d) 2-year experience cells (section 5.2.6)
e) 10-year experience cells (section 5.2.6)
40C Figures
Figure 1: Emigrant shares after EU accession: number of work permits in the UK and
Ireland from 2004-2007 divided by the number of employed people in the source country
in 2003. Source: Eurostat.
Figure 2: Number of Lithuanian emigrants to the UK and Ireland, measured by registra-
tion for work permits, i.e. PPS and NINo numbers, 2002-2007. Sources: Irish Department

















2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
PPS
NINo




























Figure 4: Scatter: wages and emigration rates for diﬀerent groups (male and female,
married and unmarried. Source: own calculations.)
42Figure 5: Wage increases for diﬀerent groups, 2002-2006, 2005=100. Source: own calcu-
lations, based on the Lithuanian HBS.














1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
43NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2010 
GC  1.2010  Cristina Cattaneo: Migrants’ International Transfers and Educational Expenditure: Empirical Evidence from 
Albania 
SD  2.2010  Fabio Antoniou, Panos Hatzipanayotou and Phoebe Koundouri: Tradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping 
SD  3.2010  Fabio Antoniou, Panos Hatzipanayotou and Phoebe Koundouri: Second Best Environmental Policies under 
Uncertainty 
SD  4.2010  Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian and Lea Nicita: Modeling Biased Technical Change. Implications for Climate 
Policy 
IM  5.2010  Luca Di Corato: Profit Sharing under the threat of Nationalization  
SD  6.2010  Masako Ikefuji, Jun-ichi Itaya and Makoto Okamura: Optimal Emission Tax with Endogenous Location 
Choice of Duopolistic Firms 
SD  7.2010  Michela Catenacci and Carlo Giupponi: Potentials and Limits of Bayesian Networks to Deal with 
Uncertainty in the Assessment of Climate Change Adaptation Policies 
GC  8.2010  Paul Sarfo-Mensah and William Oduro: Changes in Beliefs and Perceptions about the Natural Environment 
in the Forest-Savanna Transitional Zone of Ghana: The Influence of Religion 
IM  9.2010  Andrea Boitani, Marcella Nicolini and Carlo Scarpa: Do Competition and Ownership Matter? Evidence 
from Local Public Transport in Europe 
SD  10.2010  Helen Ding and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Sonja Teelucksingh: European Forests and Carbon Sequestration 
Services : An Economic Assessment of Climate Change Impacts 
GC  11.2010  Enrico Bertacchini, Walter Santagata and Giovanni Signorello: Loving Cultural Heritage Private Individual 
Giving and Prosocial Behavior 
SD  12.2010  Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Matthieu Glachant and Yann Ménière: What Drives the International Transfer of 
Climate Change Mitigation Technologies? Empirical Evidence from Patent Data 
SD  13.2010  Andrea Bastianin, Alice Favero and Emanuele Massetti: Investments and Financial Flows Induced by 
Climate Mitigation Policies 
SD  14.2010  Reyer Gerlagh: Too Much Oil 
IM  15.2010  Chiara Fumagalli and Massimo Motta: A Simple Theory of Predation 
GC  16.2010  Rinaldo Brau, Adriana Di Liberto and Francesco Pigliaru: Tourism and Development: A Recent 
Phenomenon Built on Old (Institutional) Roots? 
SD  17.2010  Lucia Vergano, Georg Umgiesser and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: An Economic Assessment of the Impacts of the 
MOSE Barriers on Venice Port Activities 
SD  18.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: Climate Change Meets Trade in Promoting Green Growth: Potential Conflicts and 
Synergies  
SD  19.2010  Elisa Lanzi and Ian Sue Wing: Capital Malleability and the Macroeconomic Costs of Climate Policy 
IM  20.2010  Alberto Petrucci: Second-Best Optimal Taxation of Oil and Capital in a Small Open Economy 
SD  21.2010  Enrica De Cian and Alice Favero: Fairness, Credibility and Effectiveness in the Copenhagen Accord: An 
Economic Assessment 
SD  22.2010  Francesco Bosello: Adaptation, Mitigation and “Green” R&D to Combat Global Climate Change. Insights 
From an Empirical Integrated Assessment Exercise 
IM  23.2010  Jean Tirole and Roland Bénabou: Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility 
IM  24.2010  Cesare Dosi and Michele Moretto: Licences, "Use or Lose" Provisions and the Time of Investment 
GC  25.2010  Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Vassilis Tselios (lxxxvi): Returns to Migration, Education, and Externalities in 
the European Union 
GC  26.2010  Klaus Desmet and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (lxxxvi): Spatial Development 
SD  27.2010  Massimiliano Mazzanti, Anna Montini and Francesco Nicolli: Waste Generation and Landfill Diversion 
Dynamics: Decentralised Management and Spatial Effects 
SD  28.2010  Lucia Ceccato, Valentina Giannini and Carlo Gipponi: A Participatory Approach to Assess the Effectiveness 
of Responses to Cope with Flood Risk 
SD  29.2010  Valentina Bosetti and David G. Victor: Politics and Economics of Second-Best Regulation of Greenhouse
Gases:  The Importance of Regulatory Credibility 
IM  30.2010  Francesca Cornelli, Zbigniew Kominek and Alexander Ljungqvist: Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter? 
GC  31.2010  Francesco D’Amuri and Juri Marcucci: “Google it!” Forecasting the US Unemployment Rate with a Google 
Job Search index 
SD  32.2010  Francesco Bosello, Carlo Carraro and Enrica De Cian: Climate Policy and the Optimal Balance between 
Mitigation, Adaptation and Unavoided Damage SD  33.2010  Enrica De Cian and Massimo Tavoni: The Role of International Carbon Offsets in a Second-best Climate 
Policy: A Numerical Evaluation 
SD  34.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: The U.S. Proposed Carbon Tariffs, WTO Scrutiny and China’s Responses 
IM  35.2010  Vincenzo Denicolò and Piercarlo Zanchettin: Leadership Cycles 
SD  36.2010  Stéphanie Monjon and Philippe Quirion: How to Design a Border Adjustment for the European Union 
Emissions Trading System? 
SD  37.2010  Meriem Hamdi-Cherif, Céline Guivarch and Philippe Quirion: Sectoral Targets for Developing Countries:
Combining "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities" with "Meaningful participation" 
IM  38.2010  G. Andrew Karolyi and Rose C. Liao: What is Different about Government-Controlled Acquirers in Cross-
Border Acquisitions? 
GC  39.2010  Kjetil Bjorvatn and Alireza Naghavi: Rent Seekers in Rentier States: When Greed Brings Peace 
GC  40.2010  Andrea Mantovani and Alireza Naghavi: Parallel Imports and Innovation in an Emerging Economy 
SD  41.2010  Luke Brander, Andrea Ghermandi, Onno Kuik, Anil Markandya, Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, Marije Schaafsma 
and Alfred Wagtendonk: Scaling up Ecosystem Services Values: Methodology, Applicability and a Case 
Study 
SD  42.2010  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro, Romain Duval and Massimo Tavoni: What Should We Expect from 
Innovation? A Model-Based Assessment of the Environmental and Mitigation Cost Implications of Climate-
Related R&D 
SD  43.2010  Frank Vöhringer, Alain Haurie, Dabo Guan,Maryse Labriet, Richard Loulou, Valentina Bosetti, Pryadarshi 
R. Shukla and Philippe Thalmann: Reinforcing the EU Dialogue with Developing Countries on Climate 
Change Mitigation 
GC  44.2010  Angelo Antoci, Pier Luigi Sacco and Mauro Sodini: Public Security vs. Private Self-Protection: Optimal 
Taxation and the Social Dynamics of Fear 
IM  45.2010  Luca Enriques: European Takeover Law: The Case for a Neutral Approach  
SD  46.2010  Maureen L. Cropper, Yi Jiang, Anna Alberini and Patrick Baur: Getting Cars Off the Road: The Cost-
Effectiveness of an Episodic Pollution Control Program 
IM  47.2010  Thomas Hellman and Enrico Perotti: The Circulation of Ideas in Firms and Markets 
IM  48.2010  James Dow and Enrico Perotti: Resistance to Change 
SD  49.2010  Jaromir Kovarik, Friederike Mengel and José Gabriel Romero: (Anti-) Coordination in Networks 
SD  50.2010  Helen Ding, Silvia Silvestri, Aline Chiabai and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: A Hybrid Approach to the Valuation of 
Climate Change Effects on Ecosystem Services: Evidence from the European Forests 
GC  51.2010  Pauline Grosjean (lxxxvii): A History of Violence: Testing the ‘Culture of Honor’ in the US South 
GC  52.2010  Paolo Buonanno and Matteo M. Galizzi (lxxxvii): Advocatus, et non latro? Testing the Supplier-Induced-
Demand Hypothesis for Italian Courts of Justice 
GC  53.2010  Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin (lxxxvii): Religious Organizations 
GC  54.2010  Matteo Cervellati and Paolo Vanin (lxxxvii): ”Thou shalt not covet ...”: Prohibitions, Temptation and Moral 
Values 
GC  55.2010  Sebastian Galiani, Martín A. Rossi and Ernesto Schargrodsky (lxxxvii):  Conscription and Crime: Evidence 
from the Argentine Draft Lottery 
GC  56.2010  Alberto Alesina, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc and Paola Giuliano (lxxxvii): Family Values and the Regulation of 
Labor 
GC  57.2010  Raquel Fernández (lxxxvii): Women’s Rights and Development 
GC  58.2010  Tommaso Nannicini, Andrea Stella, Guido Tabellini, Ugo Troiano (lxxxvii): Social Capital and Political 
Accountability 
GC  59.2010  Eleonora Patacchini and  Yves Zenou (lxxxvii): Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism 
GC  60.2010  Gani Aldashev, Imane Chaara, Jean-Philippe Platteau and Zaki Wahhaj (lxxxvii): Using the Law to Change 
the Custom 
GC  61.2010  Jeffrey Butler, Paola Giuliano and Luigi Guiso (lxxxvii): The Right Amount of Trust 
SD  62.2010  Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraio and Massimo Tavoni: Alternative Paths toward a Low Carbon World 
SD  63.2010  Kelly C. de Bruin, Rob B. Dellink and Richard S.J. Tol: International Cooperation on Climate Change 
Adaptation from an Economic Perspective 
IM  64.2010  Andrea Bigano, Ramon Arigoni Ortiz, Anil Markandya, Emanuela Menichetti and Roberta Pierfederici: The 
Linkages between Energy Efficiency and Security of Energy Supply in Europe 
SD  65.2010  Anil Markandya and Wan-Jung Chou: Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall: Review of the Changes in the Environment and Natural Resources 
SD 66.2010  Anna Alberini and Milan Ščasný: Context and the VSL: Evidence from a Stated Preference Study in Italy and 
the Czech Republic 
SD  67.2010  Francesco Bosello, Ramiro Parrado and Renato Rosa: The Economic and Environmental Effects of an EU 
Ban on Illegal Logging Imports. Insights from a CGE Assessment 
IM  68.2010  Alessandro Fedele, Paolo M. Panteghini and Sergio Vergalli: Optimal Investment and Financial Strategies 
under Tax Rate Uncertainty 
IM  69.2010  Carlo Cambini, Laura Rondi: Regulatory Independence and Political Interference: Evidence from EU Mixed-
Ownership Utilities’ Investment and Debt 
SD  70.2010  Xavier Pautrel: Environmental Policy, Education and Growth with Finite Lifetime: the Role of Abatement 
Technology 
SD  71.2010  Antoine Leblois and Philippe Quirion: Agricultural Insurances Based on Meteorological Indices: 
Realizations, Methods and Research Agenda 
IM  72.2010  Bin Dong and Benno Torgler: The Causes of Corruption: Evidence from China 
IM  73.2010  Bin Dong and Benno Torgler: The Consequences of Corruption: Evidence from China IM  74.2010  Fereydoun Verdinejad and Yasaman Gorji: The Oil-Based Economies International Research Project. The 
Case of Iran. 
GC  75.2010  Stelios Michalopoulos, Alireza Naghavi and Giovanni Prarolo (lxxxvii): Trade and Geography in the 
Economic Origins of Islam: Theory and Evidence 
SD  76.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: China in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy 
SD  77.2010  Valentina Iafolla, Massimiliano Mazzanti and Francesco Nicolli: Are You SURE You Want to Waste Policy 
Chances? Waste Generation, Landfill Diversion and Environmental Policy Effectiveness in the EU15 
IM  78.2010  Jean Tirole: Illiquidity and all its Friends 
SD  79.2010  Michael Finus and  Pedro Pintassilgo: International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does 
the Veil of Uncertainty Help? 
SD  80.2010  Robert W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins: The Effect of Allowance Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System 
Performance 
SD  81.2010  Francisco Alpizar, Fredrik Carlsson and Maria Naranjo (lxxxviii): The Effect of Risk, Ambiguity and 
Coordination on Farmers’ Adaptation to Climate Change: A Framed Field Experiment 
SD  82.2010  Shardul Agrawala and Maëlis Carraro (lxxxviii): Assessing the Role of Microfinance in Fostering Adaptation 
to Climate Change 
SD 83.2010  Wolfgang  Lutz  (lxxxviii): Improving Education as Key to Enhancing Adaptive Capacity in Developing 
Countries 
SD  84.2010  Rasmus Heltberg, Habiba Gitay and Radhika Prabhu (lxxxviii): Community-based Adaptation: Lessons 
from the Development Marketplace 2009 on Adaptation to Climate Change 
SD  85.2010  Anna Alberini, Christoph M. Rheinberger, Andrea Leiter,  Charles A. McCormick and Andrew Mizrahi: 
What is the Value of Hazardous Weather Forecasts? Evidence from a Survey of Backcountry Skiers 
SD 86.2010  Anna Alberini, Milan Ščasný, Dennis Guignet and Stefania Tonin: The Benefits of Contaminated Site 
Cleanup Revisited: The Case of Naples and Caserta, Italy 
GC  87.2010  Paul Sarfo-Mensah, William Oduro, Fredrick Antoh Fredua and Stephen Amisah: Traditional 
Representations of the Natural Environment and Biodiversity Conservation: Sacred Groves in Ghana 
IM  88.2010  Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas Cooley and Sonia Di Giannatale: A Theory of Firm Decline 
IM  89.2010  Gian Luca Clementi and Thomas Cooley: Executive Compensation: Facts 
GC  90.2010  Fabio Sabatini: Job Instability and Family Planning: Insights from the Italian Puzzle 
SD  91.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: Copenhagen and Beyond: Reflections on China’s Stance and Responses 
SD  92.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: Assessing China’s Energy Conservation and Carbon Intensity: How Will the Future 
Differ from the Past? 
SD  93.2010  Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, Leonardo Bursztyn and David Hemous: The Environment and Directed 
Technical Change 
SD  94.2010  Valeria Costantini and Massimiliano Mazzanti: On the Green Side of Trade Competitiveness? 
Environmental Policies and Innovation in the EU 
IM  95.2010  Vittoria Cerasi, Barbara Chizzolini and Marc Ivaldi: The Impact of Mergers on the Degree of Competition 
in the Banking Industry 




97.2010  Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins: Three Key Elements of Post-2012 International Climate Policy 
Architecture 
SD  98.2010  Lawrence H. Goulder and Robert N. Stavins: Interactions between State and Federal Climate Change 
Policies 
IM  99.2010  Philippe Aghion, John Van Reenen and Luigi Zingales: Innovation and Institutional Ownership 
GC  100.2010 Angelo Antoci, Fabio Sabatini and Mauro Sodini: The Solaria Syndrome: Social Capital in a Growing 
Hyper-technological Economy 
SD  101.2010 Georgios Kossioris, Michael Plexousakis, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Aart de Zeeuw: On the Optimal 
Taxation of Common-Pool Resources 
SD  102.2010  ZhongXiang Zhang: Liberalizing Climate-Friendly Goods and Technologies in the WTO: Product Coverage, 
Modalities, Challenges and the Way Forward 
SD  103.2010  Gérard Mondello: Risky Activities and Strict Liability Rules: Delegating Safety 
GC  104.2010 João Ramos and Benno Torgler: Are Academics Messy? Testing the Broken Windows Theory with a Field 
Experiment in the Work Environment 
IM  105.2010 Maurizio Ciaschini, Francesca Severini, Claudio Socci and Rosita Pretaroli: The Economic Impact of the 
Green Certificate Market through the Macro Multiplier Approach 
SD  106.2010 Joëlle Noailly: Improving the Energy-Efficiency of Buildings: The Impact of Environmental Policy on 
Technological Innovation 
SD  107.2010  Francesca Sanna-Randaccio and Roberta Sestini: The Impact of Unilateral Climate Policy with Endogenous 
Plant Location and Market Size Asymmetry 
SD 108.2010  Valeria  Costantini,  Massimiliano Mozzanti and Anna Montini: Environmental Performance and Regional 
Innovation Spillovers 
IM  109.2010 Elena Costantino, Maria Paola Marchello and Cecilia Mezzano: Social Responsibility as a Driver for Local 
Sustainable Development 
GC  110.2010 Marco Percoco: Path Dependence, Institutions and the Density of Economic Activities: Evidence from 
Italian Cities 
SD  111.2010 Sonja S. Teelucksingh and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: Biodiversity Valuation in Developing Countries: A Focus
on Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 
SD  112.2010 ZhongXiang Zhang: In What Format and under What Timeframe Would China Take on Climate 
Commitments? A Roadmap to 2050 SD  113.2010 Emanuele Massetti and Fabio Sferra: A Numerical Analysis of Optimal Extraction and Trade of Oil under 
Climate Policy 
IM  114.2010 Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny: A Numerical Analysis of Optimal Extraction and 
Trade of Oil under Climate Policy 
GC  115.2010  Romano Piras: Internal Migration Across Italian regions: Macroeconomic Determinants and 
Accommodating Potential for a Dualistic Economy 
SD  116.2010  Messan Agbaglah and Lars Ehlers (lxxxix): Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks 
SD  117.2010 Pascal Billand, Christophe Bravard, Subhadip Chakrabarti and Sudipta Sarangi (lxxxix):Spying in Multi-
market Oligopolies 
SD  118.2010  Roman Chuhay  (lxxxix): Marketing via Friends: Strategic Diffusion of Information in Social Networks with 
Homophily 
SD  119.2010 Françoise Forges and Ram Orzach (lxxxix): Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common 
Values 
SD  120.2010  Markus Kinateder (lxxxix): The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in a Network 
SD  121.2010  Alexey Kushnir (lxxxix): Harmful Signaling in Matching Markets 
SD  122.2010 Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov (lxxxix): Status-Seeking in Hedonic Games with Heterogeneous 
Players 
SD  123.2010  Maria Montero (lxxxix): The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative 
Bargaining Analysis 
SD  124.2010  Leonardo Boncinelli and Paolo Pin (lxxxix): Stochastic Stability in the Best Shot Game 
SD  125.2010  Nicolas Quérou (lxxxix): Group Bargaining and Conflict 
SD  126.2010 Emily Tanimura (lxxxix): Diffusion of Innovations on Community Based Small Worlds: the Role of 
Correlation between Social Spheres 
SD  127.2010  Alessandro Tavoni, Maja Schlüter and Simon Levin (lxxxix): The Survival of the Conformist: Social Pressure 
and Renewable Resource Management 
SD  128.2010 Norma Olaizola and Federico Valenciano (lxxxix): Information, Stability and Dynamics in Networks under 
Institutional Constraints 
GC  129.2010 Darwin Cortés, Guido Friebel and Darío Maldonado (lxxxvii): Crime and Education in a Model of 
Information Transmission 
IM  130.2010 Rosella Levaggi, Michele Moretto and Paolo Pertile: Static and Dynamic Efficiency of Irreversible Health 
Care Investments under Alternative Payment Rules 
SD  131.2010  Robert N. Stavins: The Problem of the Commons: Still Unsettled after 100 Years 
SD  132.2010  Louis-Gaëtan Giraudet and Dominique Finon: On the Road to a Unified Market for Energy Efficiency: The 
Contribution of White Certificates Schemes 
SD  133.2010  Melina Barrio and Maria Loureiro: The Impact of Protest Responses in Choice Experiments 
IM  134.2010 Vincenzo Denicolò and Christine Halmenschlager: Optimal Patentability Requirements with Fragmented 
Property Rights 
GC  135.2010 Angelo Antoci, Paolo Russu and Elisa Ticci: Local Communities in front of Big External Investors: An 
Opportunity or a Risk? 
SD  136.2010 Carlo Carraro and Emanuele Massetti: Beyond Copenhagen: A Realistic Climate Policy in a Fragmented 
World 
SD  137.2010 Valentin Przyluski and Stéphane Hallegatte: Climate Change Adaptation, Development, and International 
Financial Support: Lessons from EU Pre-Accession and Solidarity Funds 
SD  138.2010 Ruslana Rachel Palatnik and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes: Valuation of Linkages between Climate Change, 
Biodiversity and Productivity of European Agro-Ecosystems 
SD 139.2010  Anna Alberini and Milan Ščasný: Does the Cause of Death Matter? The Effect of Dread, Controllability, 
Exposure and Latency on the Vsl 
IM  140.2010  Gordon L. Clark and Ashby H. B. Monk: Sovereign Wealth Funds: Form and Function in the 21st Century  
SD  141,2010 Simone Borghesi: The European Emission Trading Scheme and Renewable Energy Policies: Credible 
Targets for Incredible Results? 
SD  142.2010  Francesco Bosello and Fabio Eboli: REDD in the Carbon Market: A General Equilibrium Analysis 
SD  143.2010 Irene Valsecchi: Repeated Cheap-Talk Games of Common Interest between a Decision-Maker and an 
Expert of Unknown Statistical Bias 
IM  144.2010  Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet: The Public Management of Risk: Separating Ex Ante 
and Ex Post Monitors 
GC  145.2010  Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, Giovanni Peri and Greg C. Wright: Immigration, Offshoring and American Jobs 
SD  146.2010  Alain-Désiré Nimubona and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné: Polluters and Abaters 
SD  147.2010  Lionel Richefort and Patrick Point: Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network 
SD  148.2010 Friederike Mengel and Emanuela Sciubba: Extrapolation in Games of Coordination and Dominance 
Solvable Games 
SD  149.2010 Massimiliano Mazzanti and Antonio Musolesi: Carbon Abatement Leaders and Laggards Non Parametric 
Analyses of Policy Oriented Kuznets Curves 
SD  150.2010  Mathieu Couttenier and Raphael Soubeyran: Drought and Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa 
GC  151.2010 Benjamin Elsner: Does Emigration Benefit the Stayers? The EU Enlargement as a Natural Experiment. 
Evidence from Lithuania  
(lxxxvi) This paper was presented at the Conference on "Urban and Regional Economics" organised by the 
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and FEEM, held in Milan on 12-13 October 2009. 
(lxxxvii)  This paper was presented at the Conference on “Economics of Culture, Institutions and Crime” 
organised by SUS.DIV, FEEM, University of Padua and CEPR, held in Milan on 20-22 January 2010. 
(lxxxviii) This paper was presented at the International Workshop on “The Social Dimension of Adaptation to 
Climate Change”, jointly organized by the International Center for Climate Governance, Centro Euro-
Mediterraneo per i Cambiamenti Climatici and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, held in Venice, 18-19 February 
2010. 
(lxxxix)  This paper was presented at the 15th Coalition Theory Network Workshop organised by the 
Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d’Aix-Marseille, (GREQAM), held in Marseille, France, on 
June 17-18, 2010.  
 